Time
Line
(SW, 17 Apr 04)
1954
Vietnamese
forces defeat French colonial troops at the battle of Dien
Bien Phu. Vietnam divided between independent North under Ho
Chi Minh, and repressive pro-western puppet regime in South.
US, unhappy with French defeat, begins military and
financial aid to S Vietnam.
1959
US sends first 800 ‘advisers’ to back up
S Vietnam
regime.
1961-63
President JF Kennedy increases US forces in
Vietnam to
3500 (1961), 11,300 (1962) and 15,000 (1963).
1964
In August, the
US under
Lyndon Johnson stages fake ‘Gulf of Tonkin incident’ to
justify bombing of Vietnam.
1965
In July, Johnson raises troop levels in
Vietnam to
over 180,000.
1967
Rise in anti-war protests as US troops rise to 485,000.
1968
In Jan, the Vietnamese National Liberation Front launch Tet
offensive, seizing control of key cities. US quells
the rising
militarily. In March, US troops massacre over 400
civilians at the
village of My Lai.
In Nov, troop levels rise to 580,000 under
Nixon.
1969
Nixon orders secret bombing of
Vietnam’s
neutral neighbour Cambodia. Huge anti-war demos in
Washington.
1970
Nixon announces invasion of
Cambodia.
In anti-war protests, 4 students are killed at Kent State
Uni.
1972
Nixon aides break into Watergate building to dig up dirt to
smear critics of his policies. Nixon re-elected Pres.
In Oct 72,
he orders intense air-raids on
Hanoi
& Haiphong (N Viet towns).
1973
Ceasefire agreement with
Vietnam
signed.
1974 Nixon forced to resign over Watergate involvement and
Gerald Ford becomes President.
1975
Last of US troops flee in helicopters from roof of American
embassy. National Lib Front takes capital
Saigon,
re-naming it Ho Chi Minh City.
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The atrocities and the racism
In Oct 1972, Nixon
ordered a series of air-raids on the N Vietnamese towns of
Hanoi & Haiphong. It was the most intense bombing in
world history – with a destructive power of 5 times the
atomic power dropped on
Hiroshima in 1945.
The US dropped 1 million tons of bombs on
N Vietnam and over 4m tons in
the South – twice the amount the US dropped during the whole
of WWII.
Thousands of villages in Vietnam were totally destroyed and
around 2 million Vietnamese killed.
The
bombing included the use of weapons banned by international
law, such as napalm and cluster bombs.
Over 100m pounds of
defoliant chemicals like Agent Orange were dropped.
Most studies of the war in S E Asia acknowledge that 4 times
the tonnage of bombs was dropped on
Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos than that used by the US in all
operations during WWar II. The
U.S. deployed some 500,000 ground troops and dropped more
than 6m tons of bombs. The U.S. aggression lasted more than
12 years. 58,000 Americans and 2-3 million
Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians lost their lives.
Christian Appy forcefully demonstrated in Working Class
War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam, that the
"search and destroy" missions were guaranteed to produce
atrocities. Certain high-profile atrocities, such as
My Lai,
achieved prominent media coverage (nearly a year after the
incident.) Far more murderous were campaigns such as the
Phoenix
program with its thousands of killings. Those in charge like
a Lt. Calley received minor punishment for allowing the
massacre of hundreds of women and children.
Socialist
Worker, 26 April 2003
More chemicals dropped than first thought resulting in
horrific deformities
Between 1961-71 agents of mass defoliation were
dropped on Vietnam to destroy food and shelter. A new
scientific study published in Nature last week
showed an extra 7 million litres of chemicals like Agent
Orange were sprayed. Jeanne Stellman of Columbia unearthed
lots of material that had been classed as top secret in
earlier investigations. Her report says: ‘Large numbers
of Vietnamese civilians were directly exposed to herbicidal
agents…’
The weapons caused horrific deformities still being
found Viet children. A Red Cross report (2003) said
650,000 Vietnamese are still suffering from the effects
of Agent Orange & similar chemicals.
A
Roy,
in her introductory essay
The Loneliness of N Chomsky,
for the new edition of Chomsky’s “For
Reasons of State” (New Press, Jan 2003)
includes the following:
Chomsky wrote in 1984:
For the past 22 years, I have been searching to find some
reference in mainstream journalism or scholarship to an
American invasion of South Vietnam in 1962, or an American
attack against South Vietnam, or American aggression in
Indochina — without success. There is no such event on
record. Rather, there is an American defence of South
Vietnam against terrorists supported from the outside
(namely from Vietnam).
Layer by layer, Chomsky reveals at its core the
pitiless heart of the American war machine, completely
insulated from the realities of war, blinded by ideology,
and willing to annihilate millions of human beings,
civilians, soldiers, women, children, villages, whole
cities, whole ecosystems — with scientifically honed methods
of brutality.
Here's an American pilot talking about the joys of napalm:
We sure are pleased with those backroom boys
at Dow. The original product wasn't so hot — if the gooks
were quick they could scrape it off. So the boys started
adding polystyrene — now it sticks like shit to a blanket.
But then if the gooks jumped under water it stopped burning,
so they started adding white phosphorous so as to make it
burn better. It'll even burn under water now. And just one
drop is enough, it'll keep on burning right down to the bone
so they die anyway from phosphorous poisoning.
Independent 11 Mar 05
Vietnamese lose Agent Orange lawsuit
A
federal judge dismissed a lawsuit by 4 million Vietnamese
that US chemical companies committed war crimes by making
Agent Orange for use in the war in Vietnam. Judge Jack
Weinstein disagreed that defoliants should be considered
poisons banned under international rules of war.
Westmoreland, commander of the
US forces in
Vietnam was a mass
killer
By NORMAN SOLOMON 20 Jul 05
[Solomon is author of the book
War Made Easy: How Presidents and Pundits Keep Spinning Us
to Death, published in July 2005.]
After he died in July 2005, Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger
Jr. called Westmoreland possibly our most disastrous general
since Custer.” From early 1964 until 1968, the
U.S.
military machine under Westmoreland methodically slaughtered
Vietnamese people. The Post's front page said
"Westmoreland's military strategy was to conduct a war of
attrition, trying to kill enemy forces faster than they
could be replaced."
Westmoreland did his best to spin the media. In April 1967,
a month when several hundred thousand Americans participated
in antiwar protests, General Westmoreland spoke to an
Associated Press luncheon and asserted that the Vietnamese
Communist enemy was able to continue the anti-U.S. struggle
"encouraged by popular opposition to our efforts,"
suggesting they could have won the war but for those
unpatriotic civilians back home.
The End of the Vietnam War, 30 Years Ago
(30April 2005)
Commentary
By GABRIEL KOLKO
[Kolko
is the leading historian of modern warfare. He is the author
of the classic
Century of War: Politics, Conflicts and Society Since 1914
and
Another Century of War?. He has also written the
best history of the Vietnam War,
Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the US and the Modern Historical
Experience.]
The
war in Vietnam ended 30 years ago with a complete triumph
for the Communists. It was the longest, most expensive and
divisive American war in its history, involving over a
half-million U.S. forces at one point-plus Australian, South
Korean, and other troops. The Americans used 15 million tons
of munitions (as much as they employed in World War Two),
had a vast military superiority over their enemies by any
standard one employs, and still they were defeated.
The
Saigon army commanded by Nguyen van Thieu
also was far stronger than their adversaries. At the
beginning of 1975 they had over three times as much
artillery, twice as many tanks and armored cars, 1400
aircraft and a virtual monopoly of the air. They had a
two-to-one superiority of combat troops-roughly 700,000 to
320,000. The Communist leadership in early 1975 expected the
war to last as much as a decade longer. I was in South
Vietnam at the end of 1973 and in Hanoi all of April 1975
until the last four days of the war, when I was in Hue and
Danang in the south. I am certain
the
Communists were almost as surprised as the Americans that
victory was to be theirs so quickly and easily; I told them
from late 1973 onward to expect an end to the war by the
Saigon regime capsizing without a serious fight-much as the
Kuomintang had in China after 1947. As a future Politburo
member later confessed, they regarded my prediction as
"crazy." They were completely unprepared to run the entire
nation, and their chaotic, inconsistent economic policies
since 1975 have shown it.
South Vietnam
had always been corrupt since the U.S. arbitrarily created
it in 1955 despite the Geneva Accords provision that there
should be an election to reunify what was historically and
ethnically one nation. Thieu, who was a Catholic in a
dominantly Buddhist country, retained the loyalty of his
generals and bureaucracy by allowing them to enrich
themselves at the expense of the people. The average
Vietnamese, whether they were for or against the Communists,
had no loyalty whatsoever to the Thieu regime that was
robbing them. After 1973, soldiers' salaries declined with
inflation and they began living off the land. The urban
middle class was increasingly alienated.
By the beginning of 1975 the regime in
South
Vietnam was beginning to disintegrate by every relevant
criterion: economically and politically, and therefore
militarily. The
Saigon army abandoned the battlefield well before the final Communist offensive
in March 1975. Moreover, with the Watergate scandal, the
Nixon Administration was on the defensive after 1973, both
with the American public and Congress.
After Nixon's forced resignation the new President, Gerald
Ford, was unable to sustain the Thieu regime while the
American army was too demoralized to keep going. The basic
problem was in
Saigon: the regime was falling apart for reasons having nothing to
do with military equipment. The Communists were stunned by
their fast, total victory over the nominally superior
Saigon army, which refused to fight and disintegrated.
Total
defeat in Vietnam 30 years ago should have been a warning to
the
U.S.:
wars are too complicated for any nation, even the most
powerful, to undertake without grave risk. They are not
simply military exercises in which equipment and firepower
is decisive, but political, ideological, and economic
challenges also.